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This Note explores the procedural contours of hybrid actions: Combined state law opt-
out Rule 23 class actions and Fair Labor Standards Act opt-in collective actions in one
lawsuit. The Note contains four parts. Part I examines the history of the FLSA, the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, and Rule 23. Part II provides a brief procedural guide to
the collective action and class action certification processes. Part III surveys published
federal court cases and ultimately posits that hybrid actions violate the Rules Enabling
Act. Finally, Part IV urges Congress to abolish collective actions by repealing § 2I6(b)
of the FLSA. In short, § 216(b) was drafted during the infancy of group litigation and
is an antiquated vestige. If Congress excises this vestige, federal courts could readily
employ updated class action and supplemental jurisdiction rules to more efficiently
adjudicate FLSA and state wage and hour claims in one action.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent boom of wage and hour litigation is one of the most
striking developments in modem legal history. Federal court filings alone
have increased nearly threefold since 2000.' For some, this trend makes
i. In 2000, 1854 suits were filed pursuant to the Federal Labor Standards Act in federal court.
STATISTIcs Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 46 tbl. C-
2 (2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2ooi/tables/co2marox.pdf. Filings reached an
all-tirne high of 6786 in 2007 then dropped to 5302 in 2oo8. See OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouRs, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS 45 tbl. C-2 (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2oo8/tables/CO2MarTO8.pdf. These statistics do not account for
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for an economic and logistical nightmare. Unlike isolated discrimination
suits, wage and hour group litigation strikes a devastating blow to the
unsuspecting employer's bottom line.' Small businesses and large
corporations alike must navigate a statutory minefield of New Deal-era
federal statutes' and rapidly changing state laws.4 Nonetheless, for others,
the wage and hour groundswell helps protect low-wage employees and
generate business for the plaintiffs' bar. Non-unionized minimum wage
employees can pool resources in group litigation,5 recover hard-earned
overtime pay, and send a powerful message to employers. Plaintiffs'
attorneys secure a steady stream of clients6  and recover staggering
settlement amounts with contingency fees.7
With so much at stake, one would expect federal courts to have
solved the major procedural problems surrounding wage and hour group
litigation. Surprisingly, this is not so. The primary source of confusion
stems from a deceptively simple difference between the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA)8 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 ("Rule
23"). FLSA claims are governed by an "opt-in" mechanism in § 216(b).'
In these "collective actions," litigants who do not affirmatively file notice
and join the litigation are not bound by the judgment.o Conversely, the
removals from state to federal court. See id.
2. Estimates place total wage and hour settlement and judgment values at over $i billion
annually in recent years. See Michael Orey, Wage Wars, Bus. WK., Oct. 1, 2007, at 50, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/o7-4o/b4052001.htm.
3. "About 115 million employees-86% of the workforce-are covered by federal overtime
rules .... ".Id. Employers' statutory risk exposure is often deceptive because several types of
businesses with sophisticated employees, such as stockbrokers, may be protected under wage and hour
laws. Id. This anomaly is caused by outmoded New deal-era job classifications, which are frozen into
many federal labor laws. William J. Kilberg, The Fair Labor Standards Act: Forcing 1938 Job
Categories on the Modern Economy, BRIEFLY ... PERSP. ON LEGIs. REG. & LrrG., Jan. 200!, at 17-19.
4. See generally Rosalind M. Gordon et al., Deductions, Recoupments or Repayments from
Payroll: Survey of State Wage Laws, in 2 37TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW IO0 (PLI
Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-782, 2008).
5. In some respects, wage and hour laws have proven to be a true leveling tool for the lowest end
of the workforce. Many suits involve large retail chains (e.g., Starbucks and Wal-Mart) in typically
non-union states, such as Texas and Florida. Orey, supra note 2; see also Brian R. Gates, Note, A
"Less Stringent" Standard? How to Give FLSA Section 16(b) a Life of Its Own, 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1519, 1541 (2005) (citing Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 170 (1989)).
6. See generally Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseloadstatistics.html
(last visited Oct. 4, 2009) (recording annual FLSA filling data from 2000 to 2008).
7. Orey, supra note 2.
8. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § § 201-219 (2oo6).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action unless he gives
his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action
is brought."). Notably, collective actions are not limited to FLSA claims: both the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), and the Equal Pay Act (EPA), 29 U.S.C. § 2o6(d),
cross-reference § 216(b). See Elizabeth K. Spahn, Resurrecting the Spurious Class: Opting-In to the Age
Discrimination Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act through the Fair Labor Standards Act, 71 GEO.
L.J. 119, 120 (1982).
T o. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
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Rule 23 "opt-out" device governs all other claims: class action litigants
who do not affirmatively file notice and exit the litigation are bound by
the judgment." Increasingly, plaintiffs file state-law wage and hour claims
alongside the FLSA claims." Regardless of the specific wage statute
involved, when an FLSA collective action and Rule 23 class action are
joined together in one suit, the result is a hybrid action."
The determination of how to handle these hybrid actions has left
lower federal courts divided. Some district courts, the antijoinder camp,
dismiss hybrid actions for a variety of reasons. These courts sometimes
hold that the FLSA substantively preempts certain state wage and hour
laws altogether. 4 Antijoinder courts also dismiss the state-law claims on
procedural grounds such as fact-based deficiencies in supplemental
jurisdiction or the failure to meet class certification requirements."
Additionally, these courts deny joinder due to Rules Enabling Act
violations or the "inherent incompatibility" of 216(b) and Rule 23.16
Conversely, projoinder courts do not dismiss hybrid actions outright.
These courts either reject the antijoinder arguments or downplay the
inconsistencies between collective actions and class actions.'"
Remarkably, no unified rationale guides either camp and approaches
vary even within the same federal district.
This Note surveys the district court struggle with hybrid actions and
guides readers around recurring procedural obstacles. Part I examines
the sociopolitical roots and legislative history of the FLSA, the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947,'8 and Rule 23. Part I provides a brief procedural
guide to the collective action and class action certification processes. Part
III surveys published federal court cases and ultimately posits that hybrid
actions violate the Rules Enabling Act. Finally, Part IV urges Congress
to abolish collective actions by repealing § 216(b). In short, § 216(b) was
ii. FED. R. CV. P. 23(c)(3).
12. See Matthew W. Lampe & E. Michael Rossman, Procedural Approaches for Countering the
Dual-Filed FLSA Collective Action and State-Law Wage Class Action, 20 LAB. LAW. 311, 315 (2005).
13. Even though courts do not follow a hard and fast rule, an explanation of terminology is
helpful. This Note will refer to "collective actions," "class actions," "hybrid actions," and "group
litigation." "Collective actions" are § 216(b) opt-in actions. While issues relating to Rule 23(b)(i) and
(2) occasionally arise, "class actions" and "Rule 23" will be shorthand for Rule 23(b)(3). "Hybrid
actions" describe the joinder of a collective action and class action in one suit. Finally, "group
litigation" refers to any or all of the above.
14. Rachel K. Alexander, Federal Tails and State Puppy Dogs: Preempting Parallel State Wage
Claims to Preserve the Integrity of Federal Group Wage Actions, 58 AM. U. L. REv. 515, 548-58 (2oo9).
While this Note will survey the procedural inconsistencies of hybrid actions, a substantive preemption
analysis is helpful as well. See id.
15. See infra Part III.A-B.
16. See infra Part III.C.
17. See infra Part II.A-C.
18. Pub. L. No. 80-99, 61 Stat. 84, 87 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
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drafted during the infancy of group litigation and is an antiquated
vestige. If Congress excises this vestige, federal courts could readily
employ updated class action and supplemental jurisdiction rules to more
efficiently adjudicate FLSA and state wage and hour claims in one
action.
. THE HISTORY OF THE FLSA, THE PORTAL-To-PORTAL ACT,
AND RULE 23
The FLSA, the Portal-to-Portal Act, and Rule 23 each arose out of
inimitable sociopolitical and historical circumstances. All three
enactments illustrate the meandering development of American group
litigation and contain pieces to the puzzle of hybrid actions. Section A
examines the drive to enshrine wage and hour regulations into the FLSA.
Section B analyzes the FLSA backlash and creation of the collective
action in the Portal-to-Portal Act. Lastly, section C charts the
transformation of Rule 23 and emergence of interest-based class actions.
A. THE FLSA
The FLSA was enacted during a defining moment of American
history. In his first term, Franklin D. Roosevelt was locked in a struggle
with the United States Supreme Court over several key pieces of New
Deal legislation. 9 The Court rebuked early attempts to regulate wages in
federal labor laws.2o In 1935, the Court held in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States2' that the wage regulation portions of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 193321 violated the Commerce
Clause.23 President Roosevelt publicly lamented this decision because he
had personally lobbied to include the NIRA wage-regulation segments.24
Just one year after the Schechter case, which dealt exclusively with
federal law, the Court decided that wage and hour regulation fell entirely
outside the scope of state legislative authority in Morehead v. New York
ex rel Tipaldo." After these blunt rejections of federal and state wage
statutes, the Democratic Party and labor unions responded in
unparalleled fashion.26 In 1936, an election year and just months on the
heels of the Morehead decision, Democrats capitalized on the Court's
39. John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 464,464 (1939).
20. Id.
21. 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
22. 15 U.S.C.-§ 703 (2006).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
24. Forsythe, supra note 19, at 464.
25. See 298 U.S. 587, 6'8 (1936) (striking down the New York wage and hour statute); see also
Adkins v. Children's Hosp. of the Dist. of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 562 (1923) (invalidating the District
of Columbia's minimum wage law).
26. Forsythe, supra note 19, at 464-65.
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unpopularity by campaigning for a constitutional amendment to
eliminate poor working conditions and child labor." Roosevelt and the
Democrats secured a pro-New Deal mandate with a landslide victory."
The constitutional amendment never transpired but the administration
took a different approach to fighting the Court." With the guidance of
then-Senator Hugo Black, 0 Roosevelt introduced the Court-packing plan
in early 1937." Sensing a loss of institutional legitimacy, the Court
tempered its stance on New Deal legislation" and upheld state wage and
hour regulation in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish.3 This set the stage for
comprehensive federal wage and hour reform.
Many agreed that the FLSA was vital but few knew how to take on
the daunting task of drafting an effective wage and hour law.' Union
leaders questioned whether they should help set wage and hour levels or
instead leave the specifics to lawmakers." Legislators debated over
flexible versus rigid wage and hour rates and disputed the mode of
administrative implementation." After 397 days and ten drastically
revised bills, Roosevelt signed the FLSA into law on June 25, 1938." In
its final form, the FLSA embodied a workable compromise between
sparring factions of the Democratic Party and the labor unions." The Act
borrowed much from labor laws developed over the preceding seventy
years. 39 Minimum wage levels, the forty-hour workweek, child labor
prohibitions, and the all-important coverage definitions such as
"employee" and "employer" were codified in one omnibus federal
statute for the first time.40 Section 216(b) conferred a private cause of
action upon aggrieved employees.4 If encountered with an FLSA
27. Id. at 464.
28. WILLAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. RoosEVELT AND THE NEw DEAL, 1932-1(40, at 196
(1963).
29. Forsythe, supra note 19, at 465.
30. Id.
31. See Judicial Reorganization Bill of 1937, S. 1392,75th Cong. (1937).
32. Forsythe, supra note i, at 465; See Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 562-
63 (1937) (validating the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 45 U.S.C. § 152); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. i, 49 (1937) (upholding the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151).
33. 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). West Coast Hotel upheld a state law but more importantly overruled
Adkins. See id. Congress could pass wage laws to ensure the "protection of health and safety." Id. at
393. In turn, these laws could abrogate employers' alleged "freedom of contract." Id. at 391.
34. Even against the backdrop of the New Deal, the FLSA was one of the most contentious
pieces of legislation to date. Forsythe, supra note i9, at 489-90.
35. Id. at 467-70.
36. Id. at 474.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 473.
39. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDs Ac-r 3-9 (Ellen C. Kearns et al. eds., 1999).
40. Id. at 15-16.
41. James M. Fraser, Opt-In Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What Does it
Mean to be "Similarly Situated"?, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 95, 99 (2004)-
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violation, employees could sue in federal or state court in one of three
ways: (i) individually, (2) on their own behalf and on behalf of other
employees similarly situated, or (3) by designating an outside agent or
representative to sue on behalf of all similarly situated employees
("representative actions").42
The overriding public policy ethos behind the FLSA was the
primacy of federal labor laws.43 It was believed that a nationwide
statutory floor was needed to ensure humane working conditions for
workers on the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder" and that state
laws would be toothless without this federal floor.45 Large employers
would suppress wages, lower the price of their goods, and ultimately find
a market for those cheap goods in states that attempted to maintain high
labor standards.46
B. THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL ACT
After its enactment, employers generally acquiesced to the FLSA
minimum wage provisions, but fervent debate arose regarding the
definition of "hours."47 Unions and businesses could not agree when an
employee's work began.t These seemingly innocuous distinctions greatly
impacted premium pay: work in excess of forty hours per week was
compensable at time and a half. 9 Miners brought FLSA suits to recover
the uncompensated time spent preparing for work and traveling to and
from the mines. On two occasions, the Court held that such time was
indeed compensable because it fell under the FLSA statutory definition
of "work." 0 Since these decisions were limited to extreme working
situations such as mining and logging, few employers paid notice."
However, in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. the Court found that
42. Id. (citing Fair Labor Standards Act, Ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. io6o, 1o69 (1938) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2oo6))).
43. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Ac, supra note 39, at 12-13 (citing H.R. REP. No. 75-2182, at 6
(1937)).
44. Id. at 13.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See Marc Linder, Class Struggle at the Door: The Origins of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,
39 Bun'. L. REv. 53, 61 (x991).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 64 n.48.
50. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 603 (1944) ("It is
sufficient in this case that the facts relating to underground travel in iron ore mines leave no
uncertainty as to its character as work."); Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine
Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 170 (945) ("We are dealing here solely with a set of facts that leaves no
reasonable doubt that underground travel in petitioner's two bituminous coal mines partakes of the
very essence of work."); id ("This travel must therefore be included within the workweek for purposes
of § 7(a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act regardless of any custom or contract to the contrary at the
time in question.").
S I. inder, supra note 47, at 95
November 2oo9] 281
HAS TINGS LAW JOURNAL
the same work preparation time applied to ordinary factory workers.
Employees could recover for the time spent preparing for work and
walking between the time clock and workstation ("portal pay")." Most
importantly, Anderson opened the possibility of retroactive FLSA suits
for previous unpaid travel and preparation time.54 This retroactive aspect
was alleged to pose a grave threat to the economy" and Congress sought
to reduce employer liability. In the months following Anderson, portal
pay suits garnered nation-wide media attention and prompted fervent
debate about unionized labor.
The Portal-to-Portal Act amended pertinent sections of the FLSA
and illustrated the legislature's pro-employer response to the increasing
amount of portal suits." Initial drafts of the Portal-to-Portal Act made it
clear that the pro-New Deal impetus behind the FLSA was gone. The
Republican Party now controlled both houses of Congress.'8 A rift in the
Democratic Party pitted pro-union Northerners against Southerners, and
pro-business forces gained a stronger lobbying foothold in Washington.59
An early House bill aimed to effectively repeal the FLSA by voiding its
statutory regulations and favoring purely private contractual standards.
The more limited Senate bill cut off retroactive portal claims in response
to Anderson but preserved existing and future FLSA suits.6' On April 29,
1947, the House met in conference and accepted the restrained Senate
version of the bill." President Truman considered the bill for ten days
and signed the Portal-to-Portal Act on May 14, 1947,' issuing a then-
unheard-of signing statement.4 In doing so, he interpreted the primary
purpose of the Portal-to-Portal Act to be to "eliminate the immense
potential liabilities which have arisen as the result of the portal-to-portal
52. 328 U.S. 68o, 690-94 (1946).
53. Id.
54. Gates, supra note 5, at 1528.
55. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, supra note 39, at 18-19.
56. See Linder, supra note 47, at i16-17. Portal pay suits were allegedly being used "as a lever for
one of the largest mass wage demands in the nation's history." Id. (quoting Editorial, The Portal-to-
Portal Issue, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 24, 1946, at 16).
57. See Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Ch. 52, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
58. See Linder, supra note 47, at 142.
59. ROBERT J. DONOVAN, CONFLICT AND CRISIS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 1945-1948,
at 229-30 (1996).
6o. Linder, supra note 47, at 156 ("Violations of FLSA would then have been reduced to
something akin to common-law breaches of contract.").
61. Id. at 147.
62. H.R. REP. No. 80-326, at i(1947) (Conf. Rep.). "By adopting the language of the Senate
provision virtually intact, the conference salvaged FLSA." Linder, supra note 47, at 156.
63. HARRY S. TRUMAN, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATEs TRANSMnTING His
APPROVAL OF H.R. 2157, THE PORTAL-TO-PORTAL Acr OF 1947, H.R. Doc. No. 247, at I (1947).
64. Id.
282 [ Vol. 61:275
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claims."6 , While signing statements are of questionable legal
significance, 6 Truman's flatly pro-business reading of the Portal-to-
Portal Act elucidates the policy pushback against the FLSA. Evidently,
the wage and hour debate did not center on "if" Congress should reduce
employer liability but rather on "how much."
The substantive portions of the Portal-to-Portal Act embody the
Eightieth Congress's pro-business leaning. The Act totally barred
retros pective FLSA portal pay claims and greatly limited prospective
suits. Importantly, the Act eliminated "representative actions" in 216(b)
by banning non-employee "agents" or "representatives."" The amended
version of § 216(b) created the modern day collective action:
An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding
sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any
one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated. No employee shall be a party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which
such action is brought. 0
Under this new language, only aggrieved employees may represent
a class of fellow co-workers." Those who wish to join the suit must opt-in
to the collective action by giving their consent "in writing."72 This scheme
reduces class sizes because litigants must take the extra step of notifying
similarly situated employees and awaiting their response. Senator
Forrest C. Donnell pushed for the revision of § 216(b) in order to "ban
65. Id.
66. Malinda Lee, Comment, Reorienting the Debate on Presidential Signing Statements: The Need
for Transparency in the President's Constitutional Objections, Reservations, and Assertions of Power,
55 UCLA L. REv. 705 (2oo8).
67. One historian suggests:
[T]he issue was not one on which substantial public opinion demanded a veto. Unorganized
workers were politically inarticulate, and a large part of the population, forgetting about the
unorganized workers whom the bill affected, viewed the extravagant portal claims as
another attempt by powerful unions to line their pockets at the expense of consumers. Thus,
Truman found no compelling reason to abandon his conciliatory posture.
Linder, supra note 47, at i6o (quoting SUSAN M. HARTMANN, TRUMAN AND THE 8oTH CONGREss 45-46
(1971)).
68. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT, supra note 39, at 19-20.
69. Under the original version of § 216(b), a claim could be brought "by any one or more
employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees similarly situated, or such
employee or employees may designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and in
behalf of all employees similarly situated." Fair Labor Standards Act, Ch. 676, § 16(b), 52 Stat. io6o,
1o69 (1938) (emphasis added).
70. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2oo6).
71. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS Acr, supra note 39, at 21.
72. Id. at 22.
73. See Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Enforcement in the
Federal Courts, 29 BERKELEY J. EM'. & LAB. L. 269, 294 (2oo8).
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all actions on behalf of employees who had no knowledge or
involvement in the litigation." 4 Even though Senator Donnell did not
fully articulate his reasons for promoting the amendment, he likely
targeted union-backed suits." Indeed, before the amendment of section
216(b), unorganized workers rarely brought any kind of FLSA suit, let
alone representative actions. 6 However genuine, Senator Donnell also
questioned the theoretical underpinnings of representative actions." He
deplored the idea of an uninterested party suing on behalf of thousands
of unaware employees. 8 In his view, it would be "unwholesome" if these
employees suddenly appeared in droves to collect a favorable judgment
well after the statute of limitations had passed. This underlying fear of
potentially infinite liability (along with anti-union animus) drove Senator
Donnell to lobby against representative actions."' As a result, the
amended § 216(b) facilitated the core policy aims of the Portal-to-Portal
Act because it eliminated representative actions and restricted the
potential for FLSA claims against employers.
C. RULE 23
While brief, this section will examine the history of class actions and
illustrate the stark contrast between the current Rule 23 and the original
1938 version which was applicable when the original FLSA and Portal-
to-Portal Act were enacted. An important theoretical distinction bears
mention. Most broadly, group litigation is based on either consent or
interest."' Section 216(b) embodies the consent theory because litigants
must affirmatively approve of the class representative. Rule 23
exemplifies the interest theory because the representative need only
show a shared legal or remedial interest with the rest of the class.
i. Class Actions: '938 Through 1965
Before 1938, representative litigation was relegated to the obscure
Federal Equity Rules and a few isolated cases No single procedure
guided court decisions" or academic opinion." The Federal Rules of Civil
74. Id. at 21 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Donnell)).
75. Linder, supra note 47, at 172-73.
76. Id. at 172 n.681.
77. Id. at 173 (citing 93 CONG. REC. 2182 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Donnell)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
So. Id.
S1. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLAss AcnoN 229-
30(1987).
82. Id. at 225.
83. Id. at 223-25 (citing Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Am. Steel &
Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' & Die Makers' Unions Nos. I & 3, 90 F. 598 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1898)); see
also Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500, 505 (1938).
84. Joseph Story, Christopher Langdell, and Zechariah Chafee reached divergent conclusions on
284 [Vol. 61:275
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Procedure were codified in September 1938, just one month before the
passage of the FLSA.' The original version of Rule 23 was a bewildering
amalgamation of existing theory and sparse precedent."' The Rule
divided class actions into three groups: "true," "hybrid," and "spurious"
suits.8, "True" suits required joinder because all garties shared a joint,
common, or secondary right at stake in the action. "Hybrid" suits arose
when numerous litigants shared a right in specific property.8 "Spurious"
suits arose when "the rights of the individual plaintiffs are separate
causes of action and they have no right to a common fund or to common
property."' Courts had tremendous difficulty applying Rule 23 in
practice and the ill-fated trichotomy drew constant criticism throughout
its twenty-eight-year existence.9 ' Significantly, the binding effect of class
actions hinged on the court's classification: true actions potentially bound
all class members, hybrid suits bound only members found to hold an
interest in the property in question, and spurious suits bound only parties
before the court."
2. Class Actions: 1966 to the Present
Rule 23 was entirely rewritten in 1966." The new Rule bore little
resemblance to the original version because the rulemakers wisely shied
away from defining classes in terms of rigid property-law relationships
among members.94 Instead, the amended Rule 23 sets out four threshold
prerequisites in subdivision (a) and requires that the prospective class fit
into one of three categories in subdivision (b)." The newly-drawn Rule
topics such as res judicata and equitable jurisdiction over multiple suits involving common questions.
See YEAZELL, supra note 8I, at 216-20, 228-30.
85. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1004, at 31 (3d ed. 2002).
86. YEAZELL, supra note 81, at 229-30.
87. The "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" terminology was coined by James Moore. See James
Wm. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25
GEo. L.J. 551, 571-76 (1937).
88. 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752, at 21-23 (3d ed. 2005).
89. Id. at 28.
90. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, § 1152, at 28 (quoting Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting
Annuities v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979,983 (3d Cir. 1941).
91. See Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23,46 COLUM. L. REV. 8I8. 822-
23 (1946) (noting that the three groups "baffled both courts and commentators" (footnote omitted)).
"[Jiudges charged with distinguishing them went home with headaches for the twenty-eight years of
the rule's operation." YEAZELL, supra note 8, at 230 (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 349 (3d ed. 1976)).
92. See 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE § 1789, at 548 (3d
ed. 2005). Furthermore, the original Rule 23 failed to provide notice requirements and courts never
satisfactorily defined the extent of the binding effects of true or hybrid action judgments. Note,
Binding Effect of Class Actions, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1059, 1o61-63 (1954).
93. 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra nOte 88, § 1753, at 42.
94. YEAZELL, supra note 81, at 229.
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b).
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23(b) categories consist of two specific class action examples and a third
catchall residual category." Though rarely used, Rule 23(b)(i) is a "mass
production version of ... the necessary-parties rule."' Rule 23(b)(2) is
designed for classes seeking injunctive or declaratory relief. Rule
23(b)(3) covers all other classes seeking monetary relief.
Rule 23(c)(2) covers notice procedures for each of the three
categories and provides that Rule 23(b)(I) and (2) classes are usually not
required to send notice to absent class members but Rule 23(b)(3)
classes must do so. These notices must inform potential class members of
the lawsuit and give them the opportunity to "opt-out" of the class. If the
recipients do not respond, they will be bound by the judgment and
barred from bringing their own suit." Theoretically, the shift to interest-
based representative litigation is clear. Rule 23(b)(3) actions assume that
the lead plaintiff represents the group's interest unless members
affirmatively opt-out. Judgments in Rule 23(b)(i) and (2) suits simply
bind the entire class.
The modern Rule 23(b) sections contain great historical significance
and key public policy compromises. The injunctive relief vehicle of Rule
23(b)(2) facilitated civil rights lawsuits in the late 1960s and 1970s."
Following Brown v. Board of Education," several pro-civil rights
lawmakers grew impatient with the slow process of desegregation and
strove for a simplified group litigation procedure.t0 ' In turn, injunctive
suits are relatively easy to file because plaintiffs are not burdened with
the onerous task of sending opt-out notices to potential class members.0 2
Conversely, Rule 23(b)(3) classes must send costly notice mailings to
hundreds or thousands of potential class members. In addition to the
notice requirement, Rule 23(b)(3) also includes stricter standards for
class certification." The asymmetries between Rule 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3) illustrate the drafters' hesitance to bind potential class members
to monetary judgments." Rule 23(b)(3)'s personal notice requirement,
heightened certification prerequisites, and opt-out right protect the due
process rights of absent class members and give them control over their
monetary claims.'05
96. YEAZELL, supra note 81, at 238 f.2.
97. "The subsection envisions a situation in which a court would ordinarily require the joinder of
parties under Rule 19 but cannot because the parties involved are too numerous to be joined
individually; Rule 23 (b)(i) permits their joinder as a class." Id. at 246.
98. See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 92, § 1789, at 550-51.
99. YEAZELL, supra note 8I, at 247.
Too. 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954).
1or. YEAZELL, supra note 81, at 247.
102. Id.
103. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
104. Cf YEAZELL, supra note 81, at 247.
o5- 7AA wRIGHT ET AL., Supra note 92, § 1784.1, at 359-6
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II. CERTIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS AND CLASs ACTIONS: A
PROCEDURAL GUIDE
Before moving to the case survey of hybrid actions, one must first
understand the mechanics of class actions and collective actions. This
section furnishes a rubric for Rule 23 and § 216(b) certification
procedure.
A. CLASs ACTION CERTIFICATION
Rule 23 mandates a two-step classification procedure: threshold
23(a) prerequisites and 23(b)(3) requirements.' In the first step, Rule
23(a) requires that
(i) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable ["numerosity"];
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class
["commonality"];
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class ["typicality"]; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class ["adequacy"].'
For numerosity, the class size must be so large that joinder of all litigants
would be impracticable."" Commonality is often met because courts
often superficially analyze Rule 23(a)(2) when certifying a (b)(3) class."
Typicality is usually ensured "if the claims or defenses of the
representatives and the members of the class stem from a single event or
a unitary course of conduct, or if they are based on the same legal or
remedial theory.""0  Adequacy tests whether the representative will
sufficiently represent the class members."' Serious due process concerns
arise in this prerequisite because final judgments bind the absent class
members unless they have opted out."' For that reason, courts carefully
scrutinize this prerequisite and may deny certification for want of
adequacy." 3 Additionally, two uncodified prerequisites are universally
io6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)-(b). This Note covers Rule 23(b)(3) certification because nearly all
hybrid actions demand exclusively monetary relief
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
io8. While one should not rely on class size precedent, few cases with classes smaller than thirty-
five members satisfy the numerosity requirement. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 88, § 1762, at 188-
93.
1o9. Id. § 1763, at 239. ("This superficial treatment of Rule 23(a)(2) may reflect the fact that the
common-question requirement may be a superfluous provision..,. since the existence of common
questions can be viewed as an essential ingredient of a finding that the case fafls within one of the
three categories of class actions described in subdivision (b).").
iro. Id. § 1764, at 270-71 (footnote omitted).
i I. Id.§ 1765,at 313-15.
112. Id. at 317.
113. Id. at 317-19.
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followed in practice: the presence of an actual class is required and
representatives must be members of the class."4
In the second step, Rule 23(b)(3) tests predominance of common
questions and superiority of class treatment over other means of
resolving the controversy."' For predominance, plaintiffs must show that
common questions of law or fact unite the representative and class
members."6 This factor ensures that the class is "sufficiently cohesive to
warrant adjudication by representation.""' Plaintiffs satisfy the
superiority requirement if they prove that the class action device is the
most effective means of prosecuting the claim."8 While Rule 23 does not
require certification at any particular time, courts are often required to
hold several hearings and discovery may be necessary to determine
whether class requirements are satisfied."' In sum, a court will certify a
class if the plaintiffs prove the four threshold prerequisites in Rule 23(a)
and the two additional requirements in Rule 23(b)(3).
B. COLLECTIVE ACTION CERTIFICATION
Unlike Rule 23, the vague language of § 216(b) gives scarce
guidance on how or when to certify collective actions. Certification
procedures are not universal and some courts fashion different
schemes.'20 However, a majority of jurisdictions employ a two-step
certification method.' 2 ' First, the "conditional certification" step
examines the size and nature of the proposed class and determines if all
members are "similarly situated."' 2 2 The court imposes a low burden of
proof at this stage and plaintiffs need only show that they abstractly
share common questions of fact with the rest of the class."' If conditional
certification is granted, the plaintiff sends opt-in notices to prospective
class members."'
114. Id. § 1759, at 117.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
16. 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 92, § 1777, at 116-17.
117. Id. at ir6 n.12 (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)).
118. Id. at 117.
I 19. See generally id. §H 1785-1785-4.
I2o. See 7B CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1807, at 484-85
(3d ed. 2005).
i12. Id. at 487-88.
122. Id. at 488-90. The "similarly situated" certification standard has been the subject of
considerable debate. See generally Fraser, supra note 41, at 95; Gates, supra note 5, at 1519.
123. 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 120, § 1807, at 489-92.
124. Unlike Rule 23 class actions, courts have discretion to oversee the mode and content of opt-in
notice. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 65, 174 (1989). Importantly, few potential class
members actually reply to the opt-in notices. Brunsden, supra note 73, at 292-94 (compiling
quantitative data on low opt-in rates in collective actions).
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The court then advances to the second step of certification after the
class members respond."' Armed with more detailed information about
the class, the court uses a heavier burden of proof and again asks if class
members are "similarly situated.",",6 Upon closer inspection, the court
often finds that common questions of fact do not unite the class: opt-in
class members and the original plaintiff might have different job types,
employer locations, or working conditions."' Consequently, few classes
survive this onerous final certification step and courts dismiss the opt-in
plaintiffs without prejudice."' However, if the court grants the final
motion for certification and the collective action proceeds to trial, the
opt-in litigants will enjoy all the same rights, privileges, and benefits as
the original plaintiff."'
III. CASE SURVEY
Now that the historical and procedural foundation has been laid,
this Part surveys published federal court cases and highlights the
confusion surrounding hybrid actions in which collective actions and
class actions are joined in one lawsuit. While litigants regularly file
hybrid actions, this survey is limited to cases with a dual FLSA-Rule 23
component; cases analyzing certain issues in isolation (such as stand-
alone FLSA conditional certification motions) are not included. Sections
A, B, and C group cases by their holding rationale and divide courts into
anti- and projoinder camps. Finally, section D argues that hybrid actions
violate the Rules Enabling Act.13
A. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
Courts often grapple with supplemental jurisdiction when plaintiffs
bring hybrid actions. While novel challenges have been put forth under
the § 1367(a) requirements of Title 28,' most courts analyze defendants'
motions to defeat hybrid actions under § 1367(c). In this analysis, judges
125. TB wRIGHT ET AL., supra note 120, § 18o7, at 495-96.
126. Id. at 496.
127. Id. at 498.
128. Id. at 503.
129. Allan G. King & Camille C. Ozumba, Strange Fiction: The "Class Certification" Decision in
FLSA Collective Actions, 24 LAB. LAW. 267, 268 n.6 (2oo9) ("[B]y referring to them as 'party
plaintiffls]' Congress indicated that opt-in plaintiffs should have the same status in relation to the
claims of the lawsuit as do the named plaintiffs.") (alteration in original) (quoting Prickett v. DeKalb
County, 349 F-3d 1294, 1297 (iith Cir. 2003))); see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2o72.
131. Some defendants have averred that federal courts lack supplemental jurisdiction because
hybrid actions are not "the type of claims expected to be tried in one proceeding." See infra Part
III.A.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
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have wide discretionary latitude to decline supplemental jurisdiction for
a number of reasons. 32
i. Antijoinder Camp
The Third Circuit provides the only appellate guidance on the
question of supplemental jurisdiction in hybrid suits. Several courts
follow this rationale and decline jurisdiction over state-law class claims.
In De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., the defendant took an interlocutory
appeal after the district judge certified both a collective action and a class
action.'3  Notably, the plaintiff amended his complaint to include a
unique implied-contract argument just before a motion to certify the
Rule 23 state-law class.' 34 At the time, the highest court of Pennsylvania
had not yet addressed the implied-contract theory.' As a result, the
Third Circuit reversed the lower court's approval of supplemental
jurisdiction because the unresolved state-law issue might "substantially
predominate" over the entire matter."36 Additionally, the court found
that the history of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal Act evinced the
legislature's favor of the more limited opt-in device.' Finally, the court
encouraged district judges to weigh the comparable class sizes and
decline jurisdiction if the Rule 23 state-law class is much larger than the
FLSA class.",
Several district courts seized the De Asencio arguments and began
denying supplemental jurisdiction of state-law claims in hybrid actions.
Using the "novel or complex" state-law argument, the court in Neary v.
Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co. declined supplemental
jurisdiction due to sheer multi-jurisdictional complexity: several state
132. Judges may decline supplemental jurisdiction if:
(i) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district
court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
133. 342 F-3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2003).
134. Id. at 305.
135. Id. at 309-1o.
136. Id. at 311. Section 1367(c)(I) discourages exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when "novel
or complex" state-law issues are at stake. Id.
137. Id. ("Congress's interest in these matters is manifest. For policy reasons articulated in the
legislative history, Congress chose to limit the scope of representative actions for overtime pay and
minimum wage violations.")
138. Id. ("[D]isparity in numbers of similarly situated plaintiffs may be so great that it becomes
dispositive by transforming the action to a substantial degree, by causing the federal tail represented
by a comparatively small number of plaintiffs to wag what is in substance a state dog."). The FLSA
class contained 447 parties while the Rule 23 state-law class had 4too persons. Id. at 305.
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wage and hour law issues would overshadow the FLSA claims.'
Weighing comparable class sizes, the court in Molina v. First Line
Solutions dismissed state-law claims because allowing class certification
"would likely result in there being more members of the Rule 23 class
than persons with FLSA claims." 40 Jackson v. City of San Antonio
combined two De Asencio rationales and declined supplemental
jurisdiction due to contrary legislative intent and incongruent class size.' 4'
District courts do not universally follow De Asencio, and other
distinctive supplemental jurisdiction analyses also exist. Oftentimes,
courts utilize the discretionary catchall provision in § 1367(c)(4) to deny
supplemental jurisdiction for "exceptional circumstances." 42 In Chase v.
AIMCO Properties, L.P., the district court found that adjudicating FLSA
opt-in and Rule 23 opt-out classes in one action would be "plainly at
odds with Congress's intent to allow workers to preserve FLSA claims by
declining to opt in."' 43 The court in Woodard v. FedEx Freight East, Inc.
framed its "exceptional circumstance" argument in a similar manner:
Rule 23 would circumvent the FLSA opt-in procedure and frustrate
legislative intent.'" Unlike Chase and Woodard, De Luna-Guerrero v.
North Carolina Grower's Ass'n, found no pressing legal issues but
instead declined supplemental jurisdiction due to logistical
complications. 45 In that case, hundreds of potential class members were
139. 472 F. Supp. 2d 247, 252-53 (D. Conn. 2007) (citing the potential for "violations of fifty states'
wage and hour statutes" as justification for declining jurisdiction under § 1367(c)()) (emphasis
omitted)); see also De Asencio, 342 F-3d at 310. Five years after De Asencio, another Third Circuit
district court held that the Pennsylvania courts had not yet decided the "novel and complex" issue of
whether the state wage and hour law covered "at-will, non-collective bargaining employees." See
Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 25o F.R.D. 178, 184 n.4 (M.D. Pa. 2oo8) (basing part of its decision
on § 1367(c)(i) discretion).
140. 566 F. Supp. 2d 770,789-90 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
141. Jackson v. City of San Antonio, 220 F.R.D. 55, 6o (W.D. Tex. 2003) (noting that the total class
size would swell from 190 to over 2000 if the state-law class was certified); see also De Asencio, 342
F.3d at 311. "The heft of the claims before the Court, then, would dramatically favor the state law
claim, assuming that not all thousands of Rule 23 plaintiffs would opt-in to the FLSA claim. This
reality would flaunt the Congressional intention that FLSA claims proceed as an opt-in scheme."
Jackson, 220 F.R.D. at 6o.
142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) (2oo6).
143. 374 F. Supp. 2d 196, 202 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing Lindsay v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 355 F.
Supp. 2d 119, 121 (D.D.C. 2004), rev'd, 448 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). The court alternatively refused
supplemental jurisdiction because the state claims could potentially predominate over the action. Id.
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).
144. 250 F.R.D. at 182-84 (granting defendant's motion to strike state-law claims). In Woodard,
250 F.R.D. at 184-89, the court relied heavily on the exhaustive legislative history survey in Ellis v.
Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Notably, Ellis did not hinge on a
supplemental jurisdiction inquiry because the court had original jurisdiction under the newly-enacted
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. See id. at 448; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
145-. 338 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (E.D.N.C. 2004)-
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spread out over multiple foreign countries, few spoke English, and even
fewer could obtain legal advice.4 6
Other courts have determined that supplemental jurisdiction does
not exist under § 1367(a).' 47 Unlike the § 1367(c) criteria, § 1367(a) is not
a discretionary inquiry but rather a statutory limitation: courts can only
hear "the type of claims expected to be tried in one proceeding."'48 In
Zelaya v. J.M. Macias, Inc., the court decided that FLSA and Rule 23
claims could not proceed in one action because of this § 1367(a)
requirement.' 49 Finally, in Bartleson v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., the
judge used a non-FLSA Eighth Circuit decision to reach a middle-ground
conclusion not found in previous antijoinder case law.5 o Interestingly, the
court extended supplemental jurisdiction to parties who affirmatively
opted in to the FLSA collective action but dismissed the state-law claims
of parties who failed to opt-in."' In fashioning this solution, the judge
explained that the non-opt-in plaintiffs could not bring a state-law cause
of action because they each lacked a federal FLSA anchor claim."
However, the opt-in plaintiffs possessed this FLSA anchor so the court
could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-law claims.'
This morass of lower court rationales and the single Third Circuit
decision fail to provide a unified antijoinder supplemental jurisdiction
analysis.
2. Projoinder Camp
Despite the plethora of antijoinder arguments, other courts
routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over hybrid actions. Just as
the antijoinder courts lack decisive appellate guidance, projoinder courts
rely on a sole circuit court case. In Lindsay v. Government Employees
Insurance Co., the D.C. Circuit overturned the lower court's decision to
bar supplemental jurisdiction on § 1367(a) grounds.'54 The appellate
146. Id.
147. De Asencio rejected this formulation and found that supplemental jurisdiction should be
declined under the discretionary § 1367(c) categories, not § 1367(a). See 342 F-3d 301, 308 (3d Cir.
2003).
148. Zelaya v. J.M. Macias, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 778,783 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
149. Id. at 782-83 ("As the. . . defendants point out, even assuming that the FLSA and NCWHA
claims arise from the same case or controversy, they are not the type of claims expected to be tried in
one proceeding, as they would involve two different and distinct sets of plaintiffs."). The court
alternatively based dismissal on § 1367(c)(4). Id. at 783.
150. 219 F.R.D. 629, 637 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (citing Fielder v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d
1031, 1036-37 (8th Cir. 1999), which analyzed supplemental jurisdiction over federal and state lending
laws).
15 1. Id.
152. Id. at 636 ("[W]here federal jurisdiction is premised on a federal class claim, supplemental
jurisdiction over a companion state-law class claim extends only to those members of the state-law
class who also have the federal class claim." (emphasis omitted) (citing Fielder, 188 F.3d at o36-37)).
153. Id. at 637.
154- 448 F.3d 416, 421-22 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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court stated that nothing in the FLSA expressly prohibits supplemental
jurisdiction.' 5 Thus, no major jurisdictional hurdle prevents courts from
hearing hybrid actions because they are "the type of claims expected to
be tried in one proceeding."'56 Although it is a fairly recent decision,
lower courts outside the D.C. Circuit have embraced Lindsay's rejection
of the § 1367(a) argument against jurisdiction.'
While Lindsay relied on subsection (a) of the supplemental
jurisdiction statute, most defendants in the surveyed cases urged courts
to exercise their discretion and deny supplemental jurisdiction under
§ 1367(c). As in the antijoinder cases discussed above, defendants argue
that class size differences, unique state-law issues, and "exceptional
circumstances" should prompt the judge to dismiss the Rule 23 state-law
claims."' But these arguments have not been found persuasive in
projoinder courts. Thus, for example, upon rejecting the § 1367(c)(2)
class size disparity argument, the judge in Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle
Farm, Inc. went so far as to say that "courts in this district ... have
unflinchingly certified FLSA and New York Labor Law claims together
without so much as noting the inherent size disparities."'" Similarly, in
Beltran-Benitez v. Sea Safari, Ltd., the court concluded that the opt-
in/opt-out difference between the FLSA and Rule 23 was not an
"exceptional circumstance" under § 1367(c)(4)."" In Brickey v.
Dolencorp, Inc., the judge rejected defendant's combined § 1367(c)(2)
and (4) challenge and briefly stated that courts are well equipped to
handle hybrid actions.16
Yet not all projoinder courts follow the same supplemental
jurisdiction script. In a relatively early hybrid action decision, the court in
Brzychnalski v. Unesco, Inc. fielded defendant's jurisdictional objection
without even mentioning § 1367. 6, Instead, the court simply noted that
the presence of an opt-in and opt-out class would not present any
155. Id. at 422.
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Salazar v. Agriprocessors, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 2d 873, 88o-8i (N.D. Iowa 2007).
r58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(I)-(4) (2oo6).
159- 239 F.R.D. 363, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Similarly, a court in the same district earlier held that a
longer limitations period would not cause state claims to "predominate" over the FLSA claims. See
Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81, 9o (S.D.N.Y. 200); see also McLaughlin v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 304, 313 (D. Mass. 2004) (holding that the fifty-one-person state-law
class would not "substantially predominate" over the thirteen-person FLSA class).
i6o. i8o F. Supp. 2d 772, 773-74 (E.D.N.C. 2001).
161. 244 F.R.D. 176, 178-79 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). Instead of undertaking a fresh § 1367(c) analysis,
the court in Nerland v. Caribou Coffee Co. simply distinguished antijoinder cases to hold that
supplemental jurisdiction was proper. 564 F. Supp. 2d 1oo, 1o28-29 (D. Minn. 2007) (holding that the
class sizes were balanced, unlike De Asencio, and that no extraordinary logistical difficulty would
inhibit notice procedures, unlike Zelaya); see also De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F-3d 301, 311
(3d Cir. 2003); Zelaya v. J.M. Macias, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 778, 783 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
162- 35 F. Supp. 2d 351,353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
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difficulty.'6 3 Notably, one projoinder case rejected the middle-ground
"opt-in plaintiffs only" solution formulated in Bartleson, the outlier
antijoinder case. In Carnevale v. GE Aircraft Engines, the defendant
argued that, under § 1367(a), supplemental jurisdiction could not extend
over plaintiffs that lacked an FLSA anchor claim.'64 The judge rejected
this theory and emphatically stated that the defendant "fundamentally
misapprehends section 1367(a) and the nature of supplemental
jurisdiction."'6 ' The court exhaustively analyzed the legislative history of
§ 1367 and held that Congress aimed to accommodate joinder of
additional parties who lacked federal anchor claims.'" Since § 1367
usurped mechanical plaintiff-by-plaintiff analyses and instead favored
streamlined adjudication, the court reasoned, nothing in the statute
would bar supplemental jurisdiction over Rule 23 claims.'t In sum,
projoinder courts have favored judicial economy and a broad exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction but lack a harmonized approach for meeting
those goals.
B. CLAss ACTION CERTIFICATION
Class action certification is the second setting where anti- and
projoinder courts adopt different approaches. As with supplemental
jurisdiction questions, courts have broad discretion to grant or deny
certification because the inquiry hinges on the unique facts of each case.
However, even though judges utilize the same two-step Rule 23
certification rubric,'M they often reach different conclusions, even when
faced with comparable factual circumstances. Additionally, since hybrid
actions contain both FLSA and state-law classes, it is worth noting when
plaintiffs bring Rule 23 certification motions in relation to the collective
action, as they are not always treated simultaneously. Rule 23
certification motions may occur at four junctures: (i) simultaneously with
the initial FLSA conditional certification motion, (2) after conditional
certification has been granted and opt-in notices are sent to potential
FLSA claimants, (3) simultaneously with the final FLSA certification
motion, or (4) after the entire collective action has been certified.'
163. Id. at 354. But see Brown v. Money Tree Mortgage, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 676, 683 (D. Kan. 2004)
(dismissing state-law claims without prejudice because plaintiff did not brief supplemental jurisdiction
issues).
164. 492 F. Supp. 2d 763, 767 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 769-7o.
167. Id. at 770.
168. See supra Part II.A.
169. See supra Part 11.8.
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i. Antijoinder Camp
Some antijoinder courts deny class action certification due to Rule
23(a) deficiencies. Of the four 23(a) prerequisites, most surveyed cases
denied certification due to insufficient commonality or typicality. In
Morisky v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., the plaintiffs sought Rule
23 certification along with the final motion to certify the collective
action.' Claimants had already responded to the opt-in notices at this
point, so the court had a relatively clear picture of the FLSA class's
characteristics."' In denying the FLSA motion, the court held that the
class and its representatives were not "similarly situated" because they
had varying job responsibilities."' For the Rule 23 state-law class action,
the court found that the plaintiffs failed to prove commonality and
typicality. 7 3 Both elements were lacking, the court stated, because the
state-law labor violations were "individual" in nature and "unique to
each [plaintiff]." 74
Other courts apply the Morisky rationale at an earlier stage in the
litigation. For example, in Bishop v. Petro-Chemical Transport, LLC, the
plaintiff concurrently moved for Rule 23 certification and FLSA
conditional certification.75  Despite the supposedly lenient collective
action first step, the court held that the FLSA class was not "similarly
situated" because plaintiff did not provide sufficient proof that defendant
denied the class overtime pay.'17 As for the Rule 23 motion, the court
found that plaintiff's insufficient evidentiary showing also defeated
commonality and typicality: he did not prove a "class wide policy of
failure to pay overtime wages" that affected every single member of the
proposed 150-person class. 7
170. III F. Supp. 2d 493, 494 (D.N.J. 2ooo).
171. Id. at 498-99.
172. Id. at 496-97. This case illustrates the strictness of the second collective action certification
step. The proposed class consisted of roughly ioo persons "whose work impacts upon the production
process at defendant's nuclear generating plants" against a single employer in one New Jersey county.
Id. at 496. Despite this seeming congruity, the court held that the class and representatives were not
"similarly situated" under § 216(b). Id. at 498.
173.- Id at Soc.
174. Id. Curiously, plaintiffs' state-law pleadings were relatively straightforward: "[P]laintiffs assert
that defendant has failed to pay them overtime compensation,... misclassifying them as exempt
'administrative' employees ... when in fact they are non-exempt 'production' workers and, therefore,
entitled to such overtime compensation." Id. at 494.
175. 582 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 2oo8).
176. Id. Recall that the initial FLSA collective action step is deliberately lenient because the court
lacks sufficient facts to make a final certification determination. See supra Part 11.B. Collective
certification exists so that the plaintiff may send opt-in notice and later convince the court that the
collective action is the proper litigation vehicle. See Vengurlekar v. Silverline Techs., Ltd., 220 F.R.D.
222, 229-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (denying certification of state-law claims due to lack of typicality and
dismissing FLSA claims sua sponte because the claimants did not meet the lenient "similarly situated"
standard in the initial conditional certification step).
177. Bishop, 582 F. Supp. 2d at 13o7-o8.
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Other antijoinder courts refuse class certification because of
insufficient predominance' or superiority as required by Rule
23(b)(3).'"9 Judges who find deficient superiority primarily emphasize
two problems: contrary Congressional intent regarding collective actions
and class actions and potential supplemental jurisdictional issues under
§ 1367(a). In Hasken v. City of Louisville, the court articulated the
supplemental jurisdiction concern.t8 There, the judge feared that
certifying the much larger Rule 23 state-law class alongside the smaller
collective action would "be akin to the minnow swallowing the whale."' 8'
One year after Hasken, the court in McClain v. Leona's Pizzeria,
Inc. examined superiority in light of Congressional intent.' The court
explained that Congress created the more arduous collective action "to
ensure that parties with wage and hour claims under the FLSA take
affirmative steps to become members of a class seeking redress of those
claims in federal court."1' In essence, the class action was not the
superior means of litigation because numerous state-law claimants could
enjoy the federal forum but side step the more demanding FLSA opt-in
scheme.'" Other antijoinder courts employ this formulation with varying
levels of emphasis on jurisdiction and Congressional intent.'5
Notably, the courts in all of the cases denying superiority granted
plaintiffs' motions to conditionally certify the FLSA collective actions.
This result is hardly unexpected: it would be quite hypocritical if the
judge first stated that collective actions are the "superior" means for
trying wage and hour claims and then dismissed those very FLSA claims.
In short, even if plaintiffs satisfy the Rule 23(a) prerequisites, they likely
face certification denial under 23(b) due to a finding that class treatment
is not superior.
2. Projoinder Camp
When faced with class certification motions on the state-law claims,
projoinder courts place a premium on judicial economy and case
178. Only one reported case bases its certification denial on inadequate predominance. See
O'Donnell v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 77, 81 (D. Mass. 2oo8). There, plaintiff twice failed to
conditionally certify the collective action in earlier motions. Id. at 79-80. For the state-law claims, the
court found insufficient predominance because the plaintiff vaguely described a statewide group of
employees "regardless of job tide or office." Id. at 8o-8r.
179. See supra Part II.A.
s8o. 213 F.R.D. 280, 282-83 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (citing Zelaya v. J.M. Macias, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 778,
782 (E.D.N.C. 1998)).
181. Id. at 283.
182. 222 F.R.D. 574,577 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Two district courts in the Ninth Circuit found that denial of class action certification would
give plaintiffs greater control over the remaining collective action, avoid supplemental jurisdiction
problems, and further the policy of the FLSA. See Edwards v. City of Long Beach, 467 F. Supp. 2d
986, 992-93 (C.D. Cal. 2o6); Leuthold v. Destination Am., Inc., 224 F.R.D-. 462, 470 (ND. Cal. 204).
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consolidation."' Some courts certify the class action and conditionally
certify the collective action. Others allow an intact hybrid action to
proceed to the merits: all Rule 23 requirements and collective action
steps are met. Since all of these cases ultimately certify both classes in
one way or another, this subsection chiefly examines how projoinder
courts handle defendants' objections to Rule 23 certification elements
and the final collective action certification step.
Unlike their antijoinder counterparts, projoinder judges have little
trouble rebuffing objections to Rule 23(a) prerequisites. In O'Brien v.
Encotech Construction Services, Inc., defendant challenged numerosity
because the proposed state-law class was comprised of only thirty
persons.' The court rejected defendant's contention and held that this
small group could proceed as a class action.'" In the judge's eyes, class
members could not afford to sue individually'" and, more troubling,
might face reprisal from the employer if they chose to file separate
claims.'" Additionally, projoinder judges frame commonality in a
plaintiff-friendly manner. In Mentor v. Imperial Parking Systems, Inc.,
the court rebuffed defendant's assertion that the class lacked
commonality.' 9' Instead of closely scrutinizing the class members'
individual job tasks, the court asserted that commonality was met simply
because all class members were denied overtime pay by the employer.'92
Finally, for the adequacy prerequisite, projoinder courts consistently
reject defendants' argument that some other entity, such as a union' or
a seasoned attorney,' is actually controlling the litigation.
In moving through the class action requirements, projoinder courts
face heavy resistance to the Rule 23(b) elements. No courts certify
classes seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) because judges
deem wage and hour claims as inherently monetary in nature.'95
186. E.g., Musch v. Domtar Indus., Inc., 252 F.R.D. 456,462 (W.D. Wis. 2oo8) (granting motions to
certify class action and conditionally certify collective action).
187. 2o3 F.R.D. 346,350-51 (N.D. Ill. 2oo).
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Duchene v. Michael L. Cetta, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 202, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo7) (finding
numerosity because of employees' inability to sue individually).
19o. O'Brien, 2o3 F.R.D. at 351-52; cf Noble v. 93 Univ. Place Corp., 224 F.R.D. 330, 342
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (certifying an estimated "several hundred" person state-law class even though only
three persons opted in to the collective action due to employer intimidation).
191. 246 F.R.D. 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
192. Id. One case concisely sums up this flexible ethos: "[T]he existence of shared legal issues with
divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate
legal remedies within the class." Romero v. Producers Dairy Foods, Inc., 235 F.R.D. 474, 485 (E.D.
Cal. 2oo6) (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 15o F-3d loll, o19 (9th Cir. 1998)).
193. Spoerle v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 434, 441 (W.D. Wis.2oo8) (finding adequacy
despite defendant's argument that the union actually controlled the litigation).
194. Lee v. ABC Carpet & Home, 236 F.R.D. 193, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo6) (rejecting defendant's
assertion that the attorney controlled the litigation).
T95. In re wells Fargo Home Mortgage Overtime Pay Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1053, V A7  (N.D.
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However, projoinder courts regularly find superiority'0  and
predominance'" under 23(b)(3). The judge in Duchene v. Michael L.
Cetta, Inc., for example, found superiority in spite of defendant's
Congressional intent argument.'0 In contrast to the antijoinder rationale,
the court found that the dominant trend was to hear both state-law and
FLSA claims in one action, not multiple suits.'" Other defendants claim
superiority is insufficient because of confusing notice forms: a hybrid
action notice form would require FLSA litigants to opt-in but also
automatically include state-law class members unless they opt-out. In
Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., the judge discarded this argument and plainly
stated, "such confusion can be adequately minimized through a carefully
crafted notice."2" Clearly, projoinder courts favor class certification and
expediency and believe all procedural protests can be addressed in other
ways.
Finally, a few projoinder courts have fully certified hybrid actions:
both steps of collective action certification and all requirements of Rule
23 were met. These cases are useful because they illustrate the stringency
Cal. 2007) (denying Rule 23(b)(2) certification in FLSA hybrid action); Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 229
F.R.D. 381, 393 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (same). Notably, courts handling ADEA hybrid actions sometimes
certify Rule 23(b)(2) classes. Compare Rodolico v. Unisys Corp., 199 F.R.D- 468, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
(denying certification under 23 (b)(2) but granting certification under 23(b)(3)), with Krueger v. N.Y.
Tel. Co., 163 F.R.D. 433, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (certifying state-law claims under both 23(b)(2) and
(b)(3)). While § 216(b) and Rule 23 govern both types of claims, the discrepancy between FLSA and
ADEA hybrid actions is not unexpected. After all, ADEA claims closely mirror the classic
discrimination claims that Rule 23(b)(2) was designed to facilitate. See supra Part I.C.2.
196. Antijoinder courts deny superiority based partly on potential supplemental jurisdiction
problems. See supra Part II.A. Intuitively, a projoinder court would dispense with this objection
because such courts always exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the entire action. Indeed, many
projoinder cases in the previous supplemental jurisdiction section also certified the state-law class
action. See generally Lindsay v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 251 F.R.D- 51 (D.D.C. 2oo8); McLaughlin
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 304 (D. Mass. 2004); Nerland v. Caribou Coffee Co., 564 F. Supp.
2d 1oo (D. Minn. 2007); Iglesias-Mendoza v. La Belle Farm, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Brzychnalski v. Unesco,
Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
197. Since the predominance and commonality inquiries are similar, defendants often posit similar
theories to defeat both elements. 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 92, § 1777, at 116. For example,
projoinder courts usually reject defendants' urging that varying job categories among class members
should defeat commonality or predominance. See Wells Fargo, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 1o65 ("In the context
of overtime pay litigation, courts have often found that common issues predominate where an
employer treats the putative class members uniformly with respect to compensation, even where the
party opposing class certification presents evidence of individualized variations.").
198. 244 F.R.D. 202, 203-04 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo7).
199. Id. "[T]here appears to be no sound policy reason why a New York State action should not be
permitted to proceed as a class action along with the FLSA proceeding." Id. at 204 (stating that
Leuthold v. Destination America, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 462, 470 (N.D. Cal. 2oo4), hinged on hostility
between class members in that case rather than congressional intent).
200. 229 F.R.D. 381, 394 (W.D.N.Y. 2005); see also O'Brien v. Encotech Constr. Servs., Inc., 203
F.R.D. 346, 351-52 (N.D. Ill. 2ooz) (disregarding the potential for confusing opt-in/opt-out notice).
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of the second collective action certification step.' In Scott v. Aetna
Services, Inc., the court certified a class action of roughly 280 persons and
a collective action of only twenty-two litigants.2 o' Before ultimately
concluding that the opt-in class was "similarly situated," the court
exhaustively analyzed the twenty-two employees' job types, work
locations, salary grades, and substantive FLSA claims." While not all
courts delve into the same thorough analysis as Scott, collective action
certification typically occurs either in a one-location plant setting'" or
when opt-in plaintiffs perform similar, skilled job tasks.2 5 Outcomes are
obviously fact-dependant, but these cases demonstrate how even liberal
projoinder courts must carefully scrutinize the final "similarly situated"
collective action step.
C. THE RULEs ENABLING ACT AND "INHERENTLY INCOMPATIBLE"
THEORIES
In the final group of hybrid cases, the courts examine whether the
Rules Enabling Act2" (REA) or the "inherently incompatible" nature of
the FLSA and Rule 23 prevent hybrid actions from being heard in
federal court. For both theories, defendants contend that the incongruent
FLSA and Rule 23 schemes should dispositively result in dismissal.
Notably, the "inherently incompatible" argument closely mirrors prior
antijoinder arguments in supplemental jurisdiction and class certification
contexts: courts should not allow plaintiffs to use the more liberal Rule
23 to circumvent the arduous requirements of § 216(b). Unlike the fact-
specific inquiry used by courts in the previous two sections, the REA and
"inherently incompatible" theories hinge on questions of law.
Nonetheless, lower courts lack a coherent approach for handling these
joinder theories as well.
r. Antijoinder Camp
As previously discussed, defendants often point out that the FLSA
and Rule 23 have divergent schemes regarding whether other employees
must opt in or opt out in order to defeat supplemental jurisdiction or
class action certification." In Otto v. Pocono Health System, the court
held that this incongruity alone was sufficient to dismiss the state-law
2o. See supra Part II.B.
202. 21o F.R.D. 261, 266-8 (D. Conn. 2002).
203. Id. at 264-65.
204. Kasten v. Saint Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 556 F. Supp. 2d 941, 956-57 (W.D. Wis.
2oo8) (156 employees from the same plastics manufacturing plant).
205. See Mendez v. Radec Corp., 232 F.R.D. 78, 81, 91-92 (W.D.N.Y. 2oo5) (seventy-six
electricians with similar job duties and pay).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2oo6 & sUpp. 2007).
207. See supra Parts IIA., IIBI.
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claims." There, the judge noted that Congress specifically created
§ 216(b) to shrink class sizes and limit employer liability.'" Thus, in the
court's view, allowing the hybrid action to proceed would "essentially
nullify Congress's intent in crafting Section 216(b) and eviscerate the
purpose of Section 216(b)'s opt-in requirement."'2 , While the case
contained a cursory overview of the FLSA's history and policy, Otto's
"inherently incompatible" approach opened the door to an alternative
mode of defeating hybrid actions."
The latest and perhaps most intricate antijoinder theory builds on
Otto's Congressional-intent rationale and posits that hybrid actions
violate the REA. In Ellis v. Edward D. Jones, the court outlined the
REA argument for the first time: (i) the REA gives the Supreme Court
the power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure, such as Rule
23; (2) such rules cannot "abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right";
(3) § 216(b) contains substantive rights; (4) the use of Rule 23 in hybrid
actions "abridges or modifies" those rights; and (5) Rule 23 should defer
to § 216(b)'s scheme and the state-law claims should be dismissed."
The first REA step is gauging § 216(b)'s "substantiveness" and
scope: if § 2I6(b) embodies substantive rights, then state-law claims
under Rule 23 could potentially be dismissed."' After a comprehensive
survey of the FLSA and Portal-to-Portal Act's history, the judge in Ellis
explained that § 216(b) embodied two substantive rights: "the right of
employers not to be sued in representative actions and the right of
employees not to have their rights litigated without their knowledge and
express consent."" In discussing the employer's limited-liability right,
the court described § 216(b) as an "immunizing" law because "its greater
goal is the furtherance of Congressional policies rather than just the
208. 4 57 F. Supp. 2d 522,524 (M.D. Pa. 2006).
209. Id. at 523-24.
210. Id.
211. Id. Other courts are beginning to follow Otto's reasoning. See, e.g., Warner v. Orleans Home
Builders, 550 F. Supp. 2d 583, 587-88 (E.D. Pa. 2oo8) ("FLSA collective actions for overtime pay are
'inherently incompatible' with Rule 23 state-law class actions for overtime pay and.. . allowing the
two types of actions to proceed in federal court in a single suit would undermine Congress's intent in
implementing an opt-in requirement for FLSA collective actions."); see also Otto, 457 F. Supp. 2d at
524 (noting that the "inherently incompatible" approach follows the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey and other circuits).
212. 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 455-56 (W.D. Pa. 2007). Ellis is based on two rationales: substantive
preemption of state wage and hour law and the REA argument. Id. at 449-52. This Note focuses only
on the REA argument. Cf Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 25o F.R.D. 178, 185-87 (M.D. Pa. 2008)
(examining Ellis and ultimately declining supplemental jurisdiction under 1367(c)(4) due to a potential
preemption issue). For a detailed discussion of preemption, see generally Alexander, supra note 14.
213. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
214. Id.; see also Otto, 457 F. Supp. 2d at 524 ("It is clear that Congress labored to create an opt-in
scheme when it created Section 216(b) specifically to alleviate the fear that absent individuals would
not have their rights litigated without their input or knowledge.").
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management of the litigation process.""' Conversely, the court deemed
Rule 23 procedural because its main purpose was to manage the
litigation process, unlike § 216(b). In explaining the employees' claim
retention right, the court noted that Congress aimed to allow employees
only to sue "in their own right," rather than through representative
actions."
After the crucial substantiveness analysis, the judge in Ellis then
went on to determine if Rule 23 "abridges, enlarges or modifies" the
employer's or employees' rights.218 First, the court explained, hybrid
actions violate the employer's right because it is no longer insulated from
liability."' Congress purposefully constructed § 216(b) so employers
would not face large representative actions.2 20 Similarly, the employees'
right is abridged because of the class action's res judicata effects:
employees who do not respond to notice will lose their FLSA claim even
though they did not affirmatively opt in to the collective action."' As a
result, the court dismissed the Rule 23 state-law claims and concluded
that hybrid actions eliminate the two substantive rights that Congress
created in § 216(b).2 2
2. Projoinder Camp
Projoinder courts disagree that the "inherently incompatible" opt-in
and opt-out schemes or the REA bar hybrid actions. Most of these cases
roundly reject the two arguments: judges either point to a lack of
precedent or simply gloss over defendants' objections. For example, in
DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., the judge rejected defendant's
"inherently incompatible" argument by simply string-citing three
projoinder cases and stating that the opt-in procedure applies only to
FLSA claims.' Similarly, other cases simply point to a lack of precedent
as the reason to reject the REA argument. 22 4
215. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 457-58; see also 19 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4509, at 268-69 (3d ed. 2005) (citing John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 724-25 (1974)) (describing substantive rights as
"rights granted for non-procedural reasons.").
216. Ellis, 52/ F. Supp. 2d at 457-58.
217. Id. at 451 (citing Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989)).
218. Id. at 457-58.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 457. The court described how most potential class members usually just throw away
notice requests because they think it is junk mail. Id. at 445-46.
222. Id. Of course, the REA violation applied only "where the state law claims merely parallel
those made under the FLSA." Id. at 460-61.
223. See 589 F. Supp. 2d lo26, 1032-33 (E.D. Wis. 2oo8).
224. Lehman v. Legg Mason, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 726,730-32 (M.D. Pa. 2007) ("[Defendant] does
not provide a single case citation in support of its contention that this suit violates the Act. Indeed, on
the rare instance when it has been raised, the argument has been rejected by the courts." (citing Neary
v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 247, 25-M51 (D. Conn. 2o7))). Neary, 472 F. Supp. zd
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Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc. is the only projoinder case that
presents a detailed counter-argument to the REA theory set out in
Ellis.2 25 First, the judge in Damassia stated that the FLSA's opt-in
provisions should be viewed "simply as procedural mechanisms for
vindication of the substantive rights provided by the FLSA.",1' Next,
even assuming that § 216(b) conferred substantive rights, the judge
claimed that neither of the two rights established in Ellis would be
"abridged, enlarged or modified" by Rule 23.' The court reframed the
employees' right by noting that § 216(b) only gave employees the right
not to "be a party plaintiff to [a collective] action unless he gives his
consent in writing to become such a party."2 Thus, the judge reasoned,
Rule 23 certification in no way impedes the employees' ability to opt in
or not to a collective action."' In regards to the employer's right, the
judge stated that § 216(b) insulated employers from FLSA claims, but in
no way impacted their liability for state-law claims.230 In turn, since
§ 216(b) did nothing to reduce state-law claim exposure, Rule 23
certification was wholly unrelated to the employer's substantive right. 3'
In sum, unlike Ellis, the Damassia case stands for the proposition that
hybrid actions do not violate the REA because Rule 23 and its
corresponding state-law claims do not collide with any of § 216(b)'s
purported substantive rights.
D. CASE SURVEY ASSESSMENT: WHY THE REA THEORY PREVAILS
The previous three sections charted how lower courts negotiate the
hurdles of supplemental jurisdiction, class certification, and "inherently
incompatible" statutes or REA challenges. This section gauges these
arguments in the order they would be addressed in a lawsuit:
at 251, rejects defendant's REA argument due to a lack of precedent.
225. 250 F.R.D. 152, 164-65 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo8); see also Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 564 F.
Supp. 2d 870, 886-89 (N.D. Iowa 2oo8) (recognizing lack of controlling authority in the REA
argument).
226. 250 F.R.D. at 164-65. Additionally, the court also noted that it was "counter-intuitive" to
view § 2 i6(b) as substantive and Rule 23 as procedural. Id.
227. Id. at 164.
228. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006)).
The right conferred by the opt-in requirement on an employee is not, as [Defendant]
contends, to have his or her FLSA claims litigated "only with his or her express written
consent;" rather, it is the right not to "be a party plaintiff to [a collective] action unless he
gives his consent in writing to become such a party."
Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 165. ("The FLSA guarantees merely that all collective actions brought pursuant to it be
affirmatively opted into. It does not guarantee that employers will never face traditional class actions
pursuant to state employment law." (quoting Klein v. Ryan Beck Holdings, Inc., No. o6 Civ. 346o,
2007 WL 2059828, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007))).
231. Id.
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chronologically from pleadings on. After assessing the supplemental
jurisdiction, "inherently incompatible" statutes, and REA theories, this
section posits that the antijoinder-REA-Ellis approach must prevail.2 32
Under this analysis, the class certification inquiry will be moot because
the ultimately successful REA analysis would compel courts to dismiss
the state-law claims at the pleading stage.
As for the threshold supplemental jurisdiction inquiry, the
projoinder camp has made more convincing arguments than the
antijoinder camp. First, the few antijoinder cases denying jurisdiction
under § 1367(a) missed the mark. 33 Section 1367(a) extends to all claims
arising from the same "case or controversy" as the underlying federal
claims.234 Since the "case or controversy" standard expands the courts'
jurisdiction to its Constitutional limits, judges should recognize that they
"shall" confer supplemental jurisdiction over transactionally related
claims.235 In the wage and hour context, § 1367(a) should naturally be
read to cover all claims relating to the employer's alleged malfeasance.
Similarly, Bartelson's "opt-in plaintiffs only"236 middle ground
formulation is impermissibly narrow. As the judge in Carnevale noted,
§ 1367 does not require every single litigant to possess a federal anchor
claim and, in fact, it abrogated the primary case that Bartelson cited as
support.237 Thus, the projoinder camp's interpretation should be followed
and courts should not deny supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367(a).238
Aside from the few § 1367(a) cases, most supplemental-jurisdiction
antijoinder cases use the discretionary function of § 1367(c) to deny
jurisdiction. Section 1367(c)'s discretionary latitude is indeed broad, but
antijoinder judges tend to use it as a convenient dumping ground for
potentially difficult legal questions. For example, when judges treat an
232. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439,455-56 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
233. See, e.g., Bartleson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 219 F.R.D. 629, 637 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (367(a)
only allows supplemental jurisdiction of FLSA opt-in plaintiffs' state-law claims); Zelaya v. J.M.
Macias, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 778, 782-83 (E.D.N.C. 1998) (1367(a) bars Rule 23 state-law claims
outright).
234. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006).
235. See id.; 32A AM. JUR. 2D Federal Courts § 604 (2007).
236. 219 F.R.D. at 637.
237. Carnevale v. GE Aircraft Engines, 492 F. Supp. 2d 763, 769-70 (S.D. Ohio 2003). "[T]he
statements upon which the Fielder court based its holding, that the claims of the absent class members
are distinct cases and controversies and that each must separately support federal jurisdiction, are
simply wrong." Id. (noting that Fielder heavily relied on Finley, which was abrogated by the passage of
§ 1367). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Fielder v. Credit
Acceptance Corp., 188 F.3d 1031 (8th cir. 1999).
238. Recall that both Lindsay v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 448 F.3d 416, 421-22 (D.C.
Cir. 2oo6), and De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F-3 d 303, 3o8 (3d Cir. 2003), the only appellate
authority on point, agree that § 1367(a) does not bar supplemental jurisdiction of hybrid actions.
Additionally, as noted in Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439, 448 (W.D. Pa. 2007),
many supplemental jurisdiction problems might be ameliorated for large class actions due to the
emergence of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
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apparent "contrary Congressional intent" between Rule 23 and the
FLSA as an "exceptional circumstance" under § 1367(c)(4),' they
essentially replace a thorough legal analysis with a cursory one; the court
should examine the potential statutory conflict rather than avoid it.
Furthermore, the comparison of potential FLSA and Rule 23 class sizes
under § 1367(c)(2) is irrelevant: the number of class members does not
necessarily impact the complexity of the legal issues at bar. 40 For
instance, if employees attack the employer's firm-wide overtime wage
policy, the raw number of litigants in each class hardly affects the court's
inquiry if that pay policy was indeed illegal under state or federal law.
Instead, courts should follow the lead of the projoinder courts and the
liberal spirit of § 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction should be freely
granted unless truly unmanageable logistical problems2 41 or matters of
unanswered state law arise.242 As for matters of statutory clashes or
inconsistent legislative intent, courts should analyze those intrinsic
questions of law under a substantive preemption,243 "inherently
incompatible," or REA analysis.
The remaining "inherently incompatible" and REA approaches
both discuss the inconsistencies of Rule 23 and 216(b) as pure questions
of law. However, under both anti- and projoinder rationales, the
"inherently incompatible" analysis is incomplete. In Otto, the source of
the "inherently incompatible" theory, the judge merely imported the
brief "contrary Congressional intent" argument from the supplemental
jurisdiction discussion.2" The court did not fully outline the history and
policy behind § 216(b), but instead halted its analysis and dismissed the
state-law claims due to the apparently "incompatible" opt-out scheme of
Rule 23.245 The projoinder courts did little to respond to this reasoning
and simply deemed Otto "4unpersuasive."246 On balance, the "inherently
239. Woodard v. FedEx Freight E., Inc., 250 F.R.D. 178, 184-89 (M.D. Pa. 2oo8); Chase v. Aimco
Props., L.P., 374 F. Supp. 2d 196,202 (D.C.C. 2005).
240. Molina v. First Line Solutions LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 770, 789-9o (N.D. Ill. 2oo7) (basing
decision on incongruent class size); see also Jackson v. City of San Antonio, 22o F.R.D. 55, 6o (W.D.
Tex. 2003).
241. De Luna-Guerrero v. N.C. Grower's Ass'n, 338 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653 (E.D.N.C. 2004) (large
non-English-speaking class spread out around multiple countries).
242. De Asencio, 342 F-3d at 309-1o (implied contract theory not answered by Pennsylvania
courts). Neary v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 472 F. Supp. 2d 247, 253 (D. Conn.
2007), highlights an improper use of the "novel and complex" state-law exception of § 1367(c)(i):
there, the court denied jurisdiction because fifty state laws could be implicated by the class action.
243. Alexander, supra note 14, at 553-55.
244. Otto v. Pocono Health Sys., 457 F. Supp. 2d 522, 523-24 (M.D. Pa. 2oo6) (citing McClain v.
Leona's Pizzeria, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 574, 577 (2004) (denying supplemental jurisdiction due to contrary
Congressional intent)).
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., DeKeyser v. Thyssenkrupp Waupaca, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d o26, 1031-32 (E.D. Wis.
208).
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incompatible" theory fails to explain what policies are embedded in
§ 216(b) and, importantly, how the opt-out scheme of Rule 23 undercuts
those policies. For that reason, the REA theory contains a more
complete explanation of the § 216(b) and Rule 23 asymmetries.
While only two cases fully discuss the REA theory, the reasoning of
Ellis is most convincing for several reasons. 47 First, Ellis provides
perhays the best historical survey of the FLSA and the Portal-to-Portal
Act. With this crucial background in mind, the judge realized that the
opt-in provision was not just a case-management provision, but instead a
deliberate tool to limit liability for employers.249 In turn, the
"substantiveness" portion of the opinion is bolstered by this historical
reality.2 0 The liability-shielding impetus of § 216(b) meets even a
conservative conception of a "substantive" right because it eliminates
representative group litigation from the FLSA."' It is clear from the
Portal-to-Portal Act's legislative history that Senator Donnell sought to
replace the representative action portion of § 216(b), a pro-labor New
Deal byproduct, with the pro-employer opt-in scheme."' In doing so,
Congress did not aim to facilitate the "fairness or efficiency of the
litigation process," but instead injected a substantive prophylaxis to
shield employers.25 3
Moreover, Ellis's conception of the employees' right to retain their
FLSA claims is linked to § 216(b)'s elimination of representative
actions.254 The opt-in scheme confers a substantive right on employees
because, unlike representative actions, they must affirmatively join the
collective action and litigate their claim."' The reward for this consent-
based form of group litigation is a closer ownership of FLSA claims and
increased control in the lawsuit-recall that collective action opt-in
claimants enjoy the full privileges of a named plaintiff at trial, unlike
Rule 23 class members."' Evidently, Ellis's formulation of the
substantive rights at stake is well reasoned and backed by the storied
history of § 216(b).257 Apparently, in Damassia, the judge
mischaracterized the opt-in provision as a "procedural mechanism for
247. Ellis v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 527 F. Supp. 2d 439,443-47 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
248. Id.
249. See supra Part IB.
25o. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 457-58.
251. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 215 (citing Ely, supra note 215, at 724-25).
252. See supra Part I.B.
253. 19 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra nOte 215 ("[A] substantive right is 'a right granted for one or
more nonprocedural reasons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or
efficiency of the litigation process."' (quoting Ely, supra note 215, at 724-25)).
254. 527 F. Supp. 2d at 456.
255. See supra Part I.B.
256. See supra Part I.B.
257. Ellis, 527 F.Supp.2d at 456; see supra Part lIB.
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vindication of the substantive rights provided by the FLSA" because he
failed to recognize that § 216(b) embodied a clear pro-employer
pushback to the FLSA.
The largest difference between the anti- and projoinder groups is
the debate over the "abridge, enlarge or modify" portion of the REA
analysis. With respect to the employees' substantive right to retain their
FLSA claims, Damassia's criticism of the Ellis conception is off base.5
The judge in Damassia stated that the presence of a class action does not
"abridge, enlarge or modify" an employee's right to opt in to a collective
action.2" This assertion is shortsighted because it parries Ellis's warning
of the res judicata danger."' Even if a lower-court judge devised a simple
and understandable notice form, the preclusive effects of Rule 23
essentially eliminate the employee's FLSA claim in all but one far-
fetched situation: where the employee affirmatively opts out of the class
action and does not opt in to the collective action.
However, in the more realistic circumstance that the employee
ignores the notice form (effectively joining the class action but not the
collective action), he or she might be bound by the entire hybrid action
judgment even though he or she did not opt-in to the collective action.6
In a large-scale hybrid action, this very real "inertia" risk could
potentially result in countless employees losing their once-protected
FLSA opt-in claims.263 Alternatively, even if res judicata does not wholly
bar subsequent suits as Ellis predicts, collateral estoppel could foreclose
future claims. For example, if the state law and FLSA wage regulations
were identical in the initial hybrid action, collateral estoppel would likely
bar decisive overtime pay issues in a subsequent FLSA suit. Crucially,
either preclusion scenario potentially threatens plaintiffs' due process
rights: their statutorily guaranteed FLSA opt-in claims are jeopardized
by the state-law class action. If courts choose to allay these problems and
simply allow plaintiffs to bring FLSA claims after a hybrid action was
decided on the merits, Rule 23 would be stripped of its preclusive power
and the class action's judicial economy would be lost.264 In sum, Ellis
258. Damassia v. Duane Reade, Inc., 250 F.R.D. 152, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo8).
259. Compare Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 455, with Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 164-65.
26o. Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 165.
261. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 455.
262. Id. (citing Brief for the United States Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Long John Silver's Rest., Inc. v. Cole, 4o9 F. Supp. 2d 682 (D.S.C. 2oo6) (No. 6:o6-cv-
3039) [hereinafter DOL Amicus Brief], available at http://www.dol.gov/sol/medialbriefs/ljsbrief-12-13-
2005.pdf; see also Robinson v. Sheriff of Cook County, 167 F.3d i155,i157 (7th Cir. 1999), cited in
DOL Amicus Brief, supra. If a class action is properly certified, a decision on the merits binds class
members who did not affirmatively opt out of the suit. 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4455, at 448 (2d ed. 2002).
263. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 444-45.
264. "Preclusion by representation lies at the heart of the modern class action.. 18A WRIGHT
ET AL., supra note 262.
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correctly holds that hybrid actions "abridge or modify" the employee's
substantive right but Damassia glosses over the res judicata and
collateral estoppel risks.
Finally, Damassia also holds that the employer's right of reduced
liability is not "abridged, enlarged or modified" by hybrid actions
because the FLSA does not insulate employers from liability for state-
law claims.'2 At first blush, this argument is appealing because the bare
terms of § 216(b) mention nothing of state-law class actions. However,
the operative REA inquiry should center on whether a concurrent class
action will affect the rights embodied in the FLSA. The employer's right
of reduced liability under the FLSA is "modified" by the previously-
mentioned "inertia" problem. In the past, if an opt-in plaintiff decided
not to join a collective action, the employer faced a smaller class and a
smaller potential judgment. However, modern hybrid actions allow
plaintiffs to lump Rule 23 and collective-action notices into a single form.
Now, when potential class members discard the notice form, the opt-out
default of Rule 23 causes the employer to face a much larger plaintiff
class than before.
In essence, the risk of "inertia" resurrects the representative actions
that Congress sought to eradicate in§ 2I6(b).'6 The employer's right to
reduced liability is at worst "modified" because it will now face a much
larger plaintiff class and potential judgment. Despite Damassia's
argument, the state and federal claims are not in two separate vacuums:
plaintiffs realize the benefit of a federal forum and a unified notice form.
Despite the clear legislative purpose to the contrary, employers pay for
this convenience in the end. However unsavory the pro-employer
protections may be, courts cannot disregard § 216(b) and hear hybrid
actions. In short, hybrid actions violate the REA because Rule 23
"abridges or modifies" both the substantive rights of the employee to
retain their claim and of the employer to be free "of the burden of
representative actions."6
IV. A CALL FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Practitioners and judges alike should take note of the REA theory
because it gives defendants a weapon to eliminate large state-law class
actions at the pleading stage. If this became routine practice, plaintiffs
would be continually rebuffed in their attempts to bring hybrid actions.
From a policy standpoint, federal law would become an afterthought:
265. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 455; Damassia, 250 F.R.D. at 164.
266. Damassia, 25o F.R.D. at 165.
267. Ellis, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 454-55 (citing DOL Amicus Brief, supra note 262); see also
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989)).
268. See supra Part I.B.
269. Ell, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 457 (quoting Hoffmann-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 173)-
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plaintiffs would either (i) bring small-scale collective actions, (2) bring
large state-law class actions and omit FLSA claims from their pleadings
altogether, (3) rely entirely on state courts, or (4) file parallel claims in
state and federal court. This unappealing result would cause innumerable
"race to judgment" scenarios and raise a plethora of questions about
cross-jurisdictional res judicata and collateral estoppel effects.
To avoid even the potential of such a chaotic judicial landscape,
Congress should take action and eliminate the collective action. Courts
cannot simply choose to ignore the history and purpose of § 216(b), but
Congress can deracinate the outmoded provision in light of modem
reality. In all respects, § 216(b) was created in a bygone era and was
designed to address two policy concerns that are fundamentally moot
today. First, federal practice has evolved greatly since the Portal-to-
Portal Act. Section 216(b) is atavistic because it stands as a consent-
based opt-in island in a sea of interest-based representative class actions.
For better or worse, representative interest-based group litigation is
firmly ingrained in both state and federal courts: the "unwholesome"
prospect of representatives litigating on the behalf of others is now an
everyday occurrence.2 0 Additionally, the protections in Rule 23(b)(3)"'
greatly insulate employers from liability, and certification is far from
guaranteed for plaintiffs. Second, Senator Donnell's fear of rising
unionism and helpless embattled employers is simply inapplicable in
modem times: a paltry 12.4% of the workforce is unionized today, unlike
33.9% in 1945.
If the collective action is abolished, the FLSA will achieve its
paramount goal of providing a federal floor for the poorest and most
vulnerable employees. Presently, collective actions are only fully certified
in two narrow instances: single-location production plants or a group of
employees with nearly identical job classifications." These scenarios are
rare because most low-wage workers find work in chain companies such
as Wal-Mart or fast food restaurants, not factories or high-skilled blue-
collar jobs. As a result, few of these chain company employees can ever
hope to litigate a certified collective action through the merits: their
varying job duties, work locations, and managers would undoubtedly
cause their class to flunk the strict "similarly situated" test.274 Ideally, if
this unforgiving certification hurdle was eliminated, countless minimum
wage workers could vindicate their overtime and minimum wage rights
through streamlined class action and supplemental jurisdiction practice.
270. See supra Part I.B.
271. See supra Part I.C.2.
272. LEO TROY & NEIL SHEFLIN, U.S. UNION SOURCEBOOK-MEMBERSHIP, FINANCES, STRUCTURE,
DIRECTORY (1985).
273. See supra Part 1II.B.2.
274. See supra Part II.B.
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Finally, this unified wage and hour class action solution would have
a positive impact on employers as well. Rather than face waves of small
collective actions, disjointed state-law class actions, or parallel
combinations of the two, employers could defeat meritless claims in one
convenient suit. Alternatively, if their odds for success were poor,
employers could more easily negotiate a single settlement instead of an
endless string of claims. Perhaps most importantly, employers would take
preventive front-end measures to avoid litigation entirely by following
FLSA and state-law regulations.
CONCLUSION
Wage and hour litigation impacts employees' rights, employers'
bottom lines, and federal court dockets. Unfortunately, lower courts lack
a guiding rationale to effectively handle hybrid actions. The REA theory
offers the most effective reconciliation between § 216(b) and Rule 23's
incongruent group-litigation schemes. No matter how misguided or
anachronistic, § 216(b) confers substantive rights on employers and
employees. Rule 23 eviscerates these rights by morphing the
intentionally-narrow collective action into a much larger and inclusive
hybrid action. Unfortunately, this is an unavoidable hindrance for
plaintiffs and an effective defense for employers. Courts cannot rewrite
or ignore the history of the Portal-to-Portal Act and § 216(b). However,
Congress can and should abolish collective actions once and for all.
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